Networks portray a multitude of interactions through which people meet, ideas are spread, and infectious diseases propagate within a society [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Identifying the most efficient "spreaders" in a network is an important step to optimize the use of available resources and ensure the more efficient spread of information.
related to the degree of the node, k, where the spreading have started. Spreading may be very different even when it starts from hubs of similar degree as comparatively shown in
Figs. 1b and c. Instead, the location of the spreading origin given by its k S index predicts more accurately the size of the infected population. For instance, Figs. 1b and 1d show that nodes in the same k S layer produce similar spreading areas even if they have different k (by definition, in a given layer there could be many nodes with k ≥ k S ).
The above example suggests that the position of the node relative to the organization of the network determines its spreading influence more than a local property of a node, like the degree k. To quantify the influence of a given node i in an SIR spreading process we study the average size of the population M i infected in an epidemic originating at node i with a given (k S , k). The infected population is averaged over all the origins with the same (k S , k) values:
where Υ(k S , k) is the union of all N(k S , k) nodes with (k S , k) values.
The analysis of M(k S , k) in the studied social networks reveals three general results (see These results indicate that the k-shell index of a node is a better predictor of spreading influence. When an outbreak starts in the core of the network (large k S ) there exist many pathways through which a virus can infect the rest of the network; this result is valid regardless of the node degree. The existence of these pathways implies that during a typical epidemic outbreak from a random origin, nodes located in high k S layers are more likely to be infected and they will be infected earlier than other nodes (see SI-Section III). The neighborhood of these nodes makes them more efficient in sustaining an infection at the early stages, allowing thus the epidemics to reach a critical mass that will allow it to fully develop. Similar results on the efficiency of high-k S nodes are obtained from the analysis of M(k S , C B ) in Fig. 2 , where C B is the betweenness centrality of a node in the network [9, 10] : the value of C B is not a good predictor for spreading efficiency.
To quantify the importance of k S in spreading we calculate the "imprecision functions" ǫ k S (p), ǫ k (p), and ǫ C B (p). These functions estimate for each of the three indicators k S , k, and C B how close to the optimal spreading is the average spreading of the pN (0 < p < 1)
chosen origins in each case, (see Methods and SI-Section IV). The strategy to predict the spreading efficiency of a node based on k S is consistently more accurate than a method based on k in the studied p-range (Fig. 3a) . The C B -based strategy gives poor results compared to the other two strategies.
Our finding is not specific to the social networks shown in Fig. 2 . In SI-Section V we analyze the spreading efficiency in other networks not social in origin, like the Internet at the router level [20] , with similar conclusions. The key insight of our finding is that in the studied networks a large number of hubs are located in the peripheral low k S layers ( Fig. 3b shows the location of the 25 largest hubs in the CNI, see also SI-Section V) and therefore contribute poorly to spreading. The existence of hubs in the periphery is a consequence of the rich topological structure of real networks. In contrast, in a fully random network obtained by randomly rewiring a real network preserving the degree of each node (such a random network corresponds to the configuration model [21] , see SI-Section VI) all the hubs are placed in the core of the network (see the red scatter plot in Fig. 3c ) and they contribute equally largely to spreading. In such a randomized structure the same information is contained in the k-shell as in the degree classification since there is a one to one relation between both quantities which is approximately linear, k S ∝ k ( Fig. 3c and SI- Fig. 13 ). Examples of real networks that are similar to a random structure are the network of product space of economic goods [22] and the Internet at the AS level (analyzed in the SI-Section V).
Our study highlights the importance of the relative location of a single spreading origin.
Next, we address the question of the extent of an epidemic that starts in multiple origins simultaneously. Figure 3d shows the extent of SIR spreading in the CNI network when the outbreak simultaneously starts from the n nodes with the highest degree k or the highest k S index. Even though the high k S nodes are the best single spreaders, in the case of multiple spreading the nodes with highest degree are more efficient than those with highest k S . This result is attributed to the overlap of the infected areas of the different spreaders:
large k S nodes tend to be clustered close to each other, while hubs can be more spread in the network and, in particular, they need not be connected with each other. Clearly, the step-like features in the plot of highest k S nodes (red solid curve in Fig. 3d ) suggest that the infected percentage remains constant as long as the infected nodes belong in the same shell.
Including just one node from a different shell results in a significantly increased spreading.
This result suggests that a better spreading strategy using multiple n spreaders is to choose either the highest k or k S nodes with the requirement that no two of the n spreaders are directly linked to each other. This scheme then provides the largest infected area of the network as shown in Fig. 3d .
Many contagious infections, including most sexually transmitted infections [23] , do not confer full immunity after infection as assumed in the SIR model, and therefore are suitably described by the SIS epidemic model, where an infectious node returns to the susceptible state with probability λ. In an SIS epidemic the number of infectious nodes eventually reaches a dynamic equilibrium "endemic" state where as many infectious individuals become susceptible as susceptible nodes become infectious [18] . In contrast to SIR, in the initial state of our SIS simulations 20% of the network nodes are already infected. The spreading efficiency of a given node i in SIS spreading is the persistence, ρ i (t), defined as the probability that node i is infected at time t [7] . In an endemic SIS state, ρ i (t → ∞) becomes independent of t (see SI-Section VII). Previous studies have shown that the largest persistence ρ i (t → ∞)
is found in the network hubs which are re-infected frequently due to the large number of neighbors [7, 24, 25] . However, we find that this result holds only in randomized network structures. In the real network topologies studied here, we find that viruses persist mainly in high k S layers instead, irrespectively of the degree of the nodes in the core.
In the case of random networks, it is found that viruses propagate to the entire network above an epidemic threshold given by β > β rand c ≡ λ k / k 2 [24, 26] . In real networks, such as the CNI network, the threshold β c is different from β rand c
. Furthermore, in real networks, we find that viruses can survive locally even when β < β c , but only within the high k S layers of the network, while virus persistence in peripheral k S layers is negligible (Fig. 4a-c ). Since the k-shell structure depends on the network assortativity the lower threshold is in agreement with the observation that high positive assortativity [27] may decrease the epidemic threshold.
The importance of high k S nodes in SIS spreading is confirmed when we analyze the asymptotic probability that nodes of given (k S , k) values will be infected. This probability is quantified by the persistence function
as a function of (k S , k) at different β values ( Fig. 4a and b) . High k S layers in networks might be closely related to the concept of a core group in Sexually Transmitted Infections research [23] . The core groups are defined as subgroups in the general population characterized by high partner turnover rate and extensive intergroup interaction [23] .
Similar to the core group, the dense sub-network formed by nodes in the innermost kshells helps the virus to consistently survive locally in the inner-core area and infect other nodes adjacent to the area. These k-shells preserve the existence of a virus, in contrast to e.g. isolated hubs in the periphery. Note that a virus cannot survive in the degree-preserving randomized version of the CNI network, due to the absence of high k-shells.
The importance of the inner-core nodes in spreading is not influenced by the infection probability values, β. In both models, SIS and SIR, we find that the persistence ρ or the average infected fraction M, respectively, is systematically larger for nodes in inner k-shells compared to nodes in outer shells, over the entire β range that we studied (Fig. 4c,d) . Thus, the k-shell measure is a robust indicator for the spreading efficiency of a node.
Finding the most accurate ranking of individual nodes for spreading in a population can influence the success of dissemination strategies. When spreading starts from a single node, the k S value is enough for this ranking, while in the case of many simultaneous origins, spreading is greatly enhanced when we additionally repel the spreaders with large degree or k S . In the case of infections that do not confer immunity on recovered individuals, the core of the network in the large k S layers forms a reservoir where infection can survive locally.
I. METHODS
A. The k-shell decomposition
Nodes are assigned to k-shells according to their remaining degree, which is obtained by successive pruning of nodes with degree smaller than the k S value of the current layer.
We start by removing all nodes with degree k = 1. After removing all the nodes with k = 1, some nodes may be left with one link, so we continue pruning the system iteratively until there is no node left with k = 1 in the network. The removed nodes, along with the corresponding links, form a k-shell with index k S = 1. In a similar fashion, we iteratively remove the next k-shell, k S = 2, and continue removing higher k-shells until all nodes are removed. As a result, each node is associated with a unique k S index, and the network can be viewed as the union of all k-shells. The resulting classification of a node can be very different than when the degree k is used.
B. The spreading models
To study the spreading process we apply the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) and Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible (SIS) models. In the SIR model, all nodes are initially in susceptible state (S) except for one node in the infectious state (I). At each time step, the I nodes attempt to infect their susceptible neighbors with probability β and then enter the recovered state (R) where they become immunized and cannot be infected again. The SIS model aims to describe spreading processes that do not confer immunity on recovered individuals: infected individuals still try to infect their neighbors with probability β but they return to the susceptible state with probability λ (here we use λ = 0.8) and can be reinfected at subsequent time steps, while they remain infectious with probability 1 − λ.
C. The imprecision function
The betweenness centrality, C B (i), of a node i is defined as follows: Consider two nodes s and t and the set σ st of all possible shortest paths between these two nodes. If the subset of this set that contains the paths that pass through the node i is denoted by σ st (i), then the betweenness centrality of this node is given by:
where the sum runs over all nodes s and t in the network.
The imprecision function ǫ(p) quantifies the difference in the average spreading between the pN nodes (0 < p < 1) with highest k S , k, or C B from the average spreading of the pN most efficient spreaders (N is the number of nodes in the network). Thus, it tests the merit of using k-shell, k and C B to identify the most efficient spreaders. For a given β value and a given fraction of the system p we first identify the set of the Np most efficient spreaders as measured by M i (we designate this set by Υ eff ). Similarly, we identify the Np individuals with the highest k-shell index (Υ k S ). We define the imprecision of k-shell identification as and C B . In both cases, spreading is larger for nodes of higher k S , while nodes of a given k or C B value can result in either small or large spreading, depending on the value of k S .
(There is an exception at large k S and small k of the livejournal database, which is due to artificial closed groups of virtual characters that connect with each other for the purpose of online gaming and do not correspond to regular users, as the rest of the database.)
, and ǫ C B (p), for β = 4%. Even though both k-shell and k identification strategies yield comparable results for p = 2%, the k-shell strategy is consistently more accurate for 2% < p < 10% with ǫ k S approximately twice lower than ǫ k . The C B identification of the most efficient spreaders is the least accurate, with ǫ C B exceeding 40%. b, We visualize the CNI network as a set of concentric circles of nodes representing inpatients, each circle corresponding to a particular k-shell. The k S indices of a given layer increase as one moves from the periphery to the center of the network [28, 29] . Node size is proportional to the logarithm of the degree of the node. We highlight the 25 inpatients with the largest degree values. Note that inpatients with high k values are not concentrated at the "center" of the network but instead are scattered throughout different k-shells. We highlight the position of the three nodes A, B, and C, of the origins that were used in the example of Fig. 1 . c, Scatter plot of the node degree k as a function of k S for all the nodes in the CNI network (black symbols) and the degree-preserving randomized version of the same network (red symbols).
Note that there are many inpatients with large k and low k S values in the original network while in the randomized email network all the hubs are located in the inner core of the network. We also show the position of the three origins used in In this study we have mainly focused on social networks, but our results can be extended to networks from practically any discipline. The datasets that were used in the paper and in this Supplementary Information are the following: a) Contact Network of Inpatients. We use records from Swedish hospitals [16] and establish a link between two inpatients if they have both been hospitalized in the same quarters.
We restrict the recording period to one week. All the data have been handled in a de- h) Product space of economic goods. This is the network of proximity between products according to Ref. [22] . We use a proximity threshold 0.3, and we recover similar results for different thresholds, as well.
We outline some of the basic properties for these networks in Table I .
II. THE k-SHELL DECOMPOSITION METHOD
In order to classify the nodes into k-shells we employ the k-shell decomposition algorithm.
First, we remove all nodes with degree k=1. After this first stage of pruning there may appear new nodes with k=1. We keep on pruning these nodes, as well, until all nodes with degree k=1 are removed. The removed nodes along with the links connecting them form the k S = 1 k-shell. Next, we repeat the pruning process in a similar way for the nodes of degree k=2 to extract the k S = 2 k-shell and subsequently for higher values of k until all nodes are removed. As a result, the network can be viewed as a set of adjacent k-shells (see Fig. 5 ). The k-shell decomposition method assigns a unique k S value to each node, that corre-sponds to the index of the k-shell this node belongs to. The k S index provides a different type of information on a node than that provided by the degree k. By definition, a given layer with index k S can be occupied with nodes of degree k ≥ k S . In the case of random model networks, such as the configurational model, there is a strong correlation between k and the k S index of a node and, therefore, both quantities provide the same type of information. Thus, the low-degree nodes are generally in the periphery, and the high-degree nodes are generally in the innermost k-shells. In real networks, however, this relation is often not true. In real networks hubs may have very different k S values and can be located both in the periphery (yellow node in Fig. 5 ) or in the core (blue node in Fig. 5 ) of the network. The assignment of a k S index to a node is also quite robust. We have randomly removed 10% and 50% of the links in the networks that we study, simulating thus incomplete infor-mation. When we measure the new k S value for the same nodes in the resulting networks (Fig. 6 ) we find that their relative ranking remains the same. We recover a practically linear dependence on the k S values of the original and the incomplete networks, showing that this measure would work equally well for predicting the spreading efficiency of nodes in a network with missing information.
III. PROBABILITY AND TIME OF INFECTION
We have demonstrated that the location of a node, as described through the k S index, is important for the extent of spreading M i when this node is the spreading origin. Here, we show that nodes with high k S are more probable to be infected during an epidemic outbreak and are infected earlier than nodes with low k S , when spreading starts at a random node.
We introduce the quantity E i , as the probability that a node i is going to be infected during an epidemic outbreak originating at a random location, and T i , as the average time before node i is infected during the same process.
As shown in Figs. 7a-d all three quantities that characterize the role of a node in an epidemics process, M i , E i and T i are strongly correlated. The nodes that are infected by a given node i form a cluster of size M i , and they are statistically the nodes that can reach i when they act as origins themselves. Thus, the probability E i to reach this node in general is directly proportional to the size M i , as shown in the plots. The average time T i to reach a node is inversely proportional to its spreading efficiency M i , which emphasizes the fact that these nodes are easily reachable from different network locations. In conclusion, the nodes with the largest k S values consistently a) are infecting larger parts of the network, b) are infected more frequently, and c) are infected earlier, than nodes with smaller k S values.
IV. THE IMPRECISION FUNCTIONS
We quantify the spreading efficiency of an individual origin i through the infected number of nodes M i . In order to compare the different methods, we rank all network nodes according to their spreading efficiency, independently of their other properties, and we consider a fraction p of the most efficient spreaders (p ∈ [0, 1]). We designate this set by Υ ef f (p).
Similarly, we define Υ k S (p) as the set of individuals with highest k-shell values. In order to assess the merit of using k-shell decomposition to identify the most efficient SIR spreaders one needs to compare the two sets Υ ef f (p) and Υ k S (p). In order to consider individual M i values, we calculate the average M ef f (p) and M k S (p) values for the sets Υ ef f (p) and Υ k S (p) the number of nodes that we consider in the comparison. By definition,
and the equality is only reached if Υ ef f (p) = Υ k S (p). We assess the imprecision of k-shell identification by calculating the ratio between M ef f (p) and M k S (p):
Similarly, we can define ǫ k (p) and ǫ C B (p):
A value for ǫ close to 0 denotes a very efficient process, since the nodes that are chosen are practically those that contribute most to epidemics. In all cases, the k S method yields a spreading that is closer to the optimum than either the degree or the betweenness centrality.
Additionally, this behavior is independent on the fraction of spreaders p that we consider in each case. 
V. SIR SPREADING EFFICIENCY
In the main text we present results for M(k S , k) for the email network, the CNI, the actor network and the Livejournal network. Here, we present additional results of the k-shell analysis of the Internet at the Router Level (RL) and the scientific collaboration network. Figure 9 shows the results for M(k S , k) and M(k S , C B ). The conclusion on the spreading importance of high k S nodes is exactly the same as for the social networks in the main text.
The results on the nodes efficiency are not significantly influenced by the choice of the infected probability value, β. In Fig. 10 we present the infected percentage M for different networks, as an average over nodes that belong in the same k S range, for different β values. The nodes in higher k-shells are consistently reaching a larger fraction of the network. Our main interest is in the β range where we are above the critical point, M > 0, but the average infection reaches a finite but small fraction, in the range of 1-20%. When the average spreading is even larger, nodes of lower k-shells can become efficient too, because in this case there is a high probability to reach the 'core' of the network, and this would enable the spreading to extend over an even larger part of the network.
For β values in this 'intermediate' range, the distribution P (M) of the infected percentage M is composed by two well-defined peaks (Fig. 11) . The first is at M = 0 and corresponds to those instances where the infection dies within the first few infection steps. The second peak is at a finite fraction M, and it seems to be at the same point for all origins. However, the intensity of each peak strongly differs, depending on the k S value of the origin. For the higher k S value in the plot, the stronger peak is at the non-zero value, and very few realizations end up at M = 0 even for smaller degrees. On the contrary, an origin with larger degree k, but smaller k S value results in a stronger peak at M = 0. These distributions converge quite well, and we can expect that nodes with small k S will in general result in a higher peak at M = 0. The above means that if an infection can reach a critical mass of nodes then it will eventually cover a significant part of the network. The low k-shell nodes cannot reach this critical mass so that the infection dies at the early stages, resulting to the strong peak at M = 0. On the contrary, the neighborhood of high k-shell nodes is favorable for sustaining an infection at early stages, allowing the system to reach this critical mass. We also highlight the location of the 25 largest hubs in the k-shell structure of the studied networks. Fig. 12 shows the results for the collaboration, actor, email, RL Internet, AS Internet, and Product space networks. High-degree nodes in most of the studied networks are scattered at different k-shells: the high-k nodes appear both in the periphery (starting as low as k S = 1) and in the network center (large k S value). In certain cases, such as in the actors network, the largest hubs are located in the highest k S layers. The relation of k S and k in the AS Internet and the product space is strongly monotonic, and there are very few nodes where k S is large or small compared to the degree k. This is a typical behavior for random networks, and the structure of these two networks is significantly close to their randomized counterparts. In these cases, choosing a node based on its degree or its k-shell index does not make a difference, since they practically lead to the same nodes. It is clear that the assortative behavior in a network can influence the extent to which hubs will appear in the periphery or in the core of a network. In principle, in a highly disassortative network we expect more hubs in the periphery, due to their tendency to connect to low-degree nodes. However, even in assortative networks it is possible that some hubs may still belong to low k-shells, so that the k S value will appropriately rank even these exceptions. The average degree of the nodes in a specific shell follows roughly a power law with k S (Fig. 13) . The deviations from this average behavior emphasize the importance of spreaders within the core of the network having high values of k S and potentially smaller degrees, than those with high k and low k S values.
The complex organization of the nodes in the k-shells is highlighted when we randomly rewire the links in the networks, yet preserving the nodes degree. This rewiring 'restores' all the hubs to the innermost k-shell of the system and imposes a strict hierarchy of nodes in terms of both k and k S . The bottom row of plots in Fig. 12 shows the scatter-plots of degree k as a function of k-shell index k S for every node in the network. In all cases, a monotonic relation of k vs k S is followed in the 'rewired' networks (red symbols), where now all the hubs appear in the highest k-shell) as opposed to the weak correlation between k and k S in the original networks (shown in black).
VI. REWIRING HIGHLIGHTS THE IMPORTANCE OF k-SHELL
In Figs. 1a and 1b of the main text we show that the extent of infection can be remarkably different, although we start from two origins with similar degree. The importance of the structure in the dynamics of spreading can be highlighted if we randomly rewire the network. During this process the original degrees of all nodes are preserved, but random neighbors are chosen for each node, destroying thus any correlations and any patterns in the local connectivity. We denote by P (M|i) the probability that a percentage M of the total population will be infected if a disease originates on node i. In Figs. 1a ,b of the main text and in Fig.14a we show that two nodes #1 and #2 with similar degree may yield markedly different distributions P (M|1) and P (M|2). After rewiring, these distributions become practically indistinguishable (see Fig. 14b ).
VII. VIRUS PERSISTENCE IN SIS
Many infectious diseases, including most sexually transmitted infections, do not confer immunity after infection, so that they cannot be described via the SIR model. These cases are better simulated through the SIS epidemic model [18] . The dynamics of SIS epidemics is different, since the number of infected nodes eventually reaches a dynamic equilibrium propagate the infection at all. The importance of the organization of the network is highlighted when we randomly rewire the network (preserving the same degree for all nodes). In this case both distributions P (M |A) and P (M |B) coincide and both hubs contribute equally to spreading. Notice also that spreading in the rewired network extends over a much larger size of the population.
"endemic" state at which exactly as many infectious individuals become susceptible as sus-ceptible nodes become infected [18] . The quantity characterizing the role of nodes in SIS spreading is the persistence, ρ i (t), defined as the probability that node i is infected at time t [7] . In an endemic SIS state, which is reached asymptotically, ρ i becomes independent of t. The persistence ρ has been shown to be higher in hubs which are reinfected frequently due to the large number of their neighbors [7, 24, 25] . To uncover the role of k-shell layers in SIS spreading we use the joint persistence function
Here we present results for the virus persistence in the Actor, Collaboration, Email and RL Internet Networks. Similar to Fig. 4 , we depict ρ(k S , k) in both supercritical (β > β c ) and subcritical (β < β c ) regimes, where β c is the critical threshold. In the supercritical regime, ρ(k, k S ) increases with both k and k S , with maximum values corresponding to hubs in the innermost layers (see Fig. 15 ). As depicted in Fig. 15 , in the subcritical regime, viruses persist only in the highest k S layers, while the probability of finding an infected node in low k-shells is negligible.
In order to determine in the above networks the actual epidemic threshold β c we study the behavior of SIS spreading over a wide range of β values. In order to highlight the role of k-shells in spreading, we organize several groups of nodes based on the k S layers of each network. Every such group comprises approximately 100 randomly chosen nodes with the corresponding k-shell indices. In order to achieve similar average degree in each of the groups, we pick nodes with uniform probability based on their degree. As shown in Fig. 16 , virus persistence is consistently higher in the inner k-shells for all values of β. Moreover, we find substantially lower epidemic thresholds than in the random cases β c < β rand c in all considered networks except for the Email Contact network.
The results of Figs. 15 and 16 suggest that the observed persistence of a virus is due to the dense sub-network formed by nodes in the innermost k-shell, which helps the virus to consistently survive locally in this area. Indeed, the innermost layers can be regarded as a small subgraph exclusively consisting of hubs. By definition, all nodes in this innermost k-shell will have degrees k ≥ k Smax . Therefore, as a simple approximation, one can regard the innermost core of a network as a regular graph consisting of nodes with the same degree
The mean-field solution of the SIS spreading in a regular graph can be found, for instance in Ref. [24] . We reproduce this solution below for the sake of convenience.
The master equation describing the time evolution at a mean-field level of the average density of infected individuals ρ(t):
dρ(t) dt = −ρ(t) + βkρ(t)(1 − ρ(t)),
where k is the degree of all nodes in the regular graph. The first term on the right hand side of Eq. (7) accounts for infected nodes becoming healthy. The second term on the right hand side of Eq. (7) accounts for healthy nodes becoming infected: a randomly chosen node is healthy with probability 1 − ρ(t), this healthy node can be infected by either of its k neighbor nodes with total probability of βkρ(t). The stationary endemic state is reached when dρ(t)/dt = 0 which leads to
indicating the existence of a nonzero epidemic threshold of β = 1/k. The innermost core of a network consisting only of nodes with degrees k ≥ k Smax will have epidemic threshold
The above inequality holds for all considered networks. Moreover, this inequality becomes an equality for CNI and collaboration networks where nearly all nodes in the innermost cores have degree k ≈ k Smax .
FIG. 16:
How average SIS persistence in different k-shells depends on virus contagiousness. For every network we randomly sample several groups of nodes based on k-shell index (as described in SI). We plot the average virus persistence ρ for every group of nodes as a function of β for the Email, Actor, Collaboration and RL Internet networks. Virus persistence is higher for nodes located in higher k-shells.
